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Runtime Monitoring is a lightweight and dynamic verification technique that involves observ-
ing the internal operations of a software system and/or its interactions with other external
entities, with the aim of determining whether the system satisfies or violates a correctness
specification. Compilation techniques employed in Runtime Monitoring tools allow monitors
to be automatically derived from high-level correctness specifications (aka. properties). This
allows the same property to be converted into different types of monitors, which may apply
different instrumentation techniques for checking whether the property was satisfied or not.
In this paper we compare and contrast the various types of monitoring methodologies found
in the current literature, and classify them into a spectrum of monitoring instrumentation
techniques, ranging from completely asynchronous monitoring on the one end to completely
synchronous monitoring on the other.
1 Introduction
Formally ensuring the correctness of modern-day concurrent systems is an arduous task, mainly
because exhaustive methods such as model-checking quickly run into state-explosion problems;
this is typically caused by the multiple thread interleavings of the system being analysed, and
the range of data the system can input and react to. Runtime Monitoring [25] is an appealing
compromise towards ensuring correctness, as it circumvents such scalability issues by verifying
only the current system execution. Runtime Monitoring thus employs techniques for observing
the internal operations of a software system and/or its interactions with other external entities
with the aim of determining whether the system satisfies or violates a correctness specification.
Most runtime monitoring frameworks [24, 23, 12, 2, 21, 13, 28, 19] employ compilation techniques
that synthesise monitors from high-level correctness specifications (aka. properties), expressed
in terms of a formal logic — the synthesised monitors then execute in tandem with the system.
Automatic monitor synthesis permits for the same property to be converted into a monitor
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which may apply different instrumentation techniques for observing the system. This allows the
designated monitor to determine whether the property was satisfied or violated.
In this paper we therefore examine the different types of monitoring instrumentation tech-
niques found in the current literature. In Section 2 we establish the terminology that we will
be using throughout this paper and provide the necessary preliminary material for better un-
derstanding the monitoring instrumentation approaches identified in our survey. Particularly,
we disambiguate between online and offline monitoring and we go into detail wrt. the former,
by defining what we mean when referring to synchronous and asynchronous monitoring. In
Section 3 we then present a spectrum of online monitoring instrumentation techniques wrt. con-
current (component-based) systems, which is based on the different definitions that one can
find in the current literature. This spectrum classifies the identified monitoring instrumentation
techniques by the level of coupling and control that they posses over the system’s components.
In Section 4 we then analyse the monitoring approaches employed by state-of-the-art runtime
monitoring tools, wrt. our classification of monitoring approaches. Finally, in Section 5 we
conclude with a summary of our contributions.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the necessary background material for understanding our survey.
Particularly, we look into offline monitoring as this is often confused with asynchronous online
monitoring, while we also discuss online monitoring in terms of the different definitions that one
can find in the current literature.
2.1 Offline and Online monitoring
Runtime monitoring can immediately be divided into two main classes, namely Online and
Offline monitoring. In offline monitoring [25, 11, 20, 26] the system is not directly monitored
while it is executing. Instead, the relevant system events are recorded as an execution trace
inside a data store. Once the monitored system terminates (or whenever a satisfactory number
of events have been recorded), the collected execution trace is forwarded to the offline monitor.
The offline monitor, which is entirely independent from the system, then proceeds by inspecting
the system events recorded in the trace. Provided that the trace provides enough information,
the monitor is able to deduce whether the correctness property was satisfied or violated.
Offline monitors are particularly suitable for properties that can only be verified by globally
analysing the complete execution trace that is generated once the system stops executing. In
fact, some properties may require to be globally analysed using a backward traversal [26, 27]
of the trace, and occasionally requires going back and forth along this trace during analysis
[27]. This monitoring technique is less intrusive compared to online monitoring, as it does not
interfere with the system except for the logging of events, thus imposing little runtime overhead.
This, however, comes at the cost of late detections, since violations can only be detected once
the system stops executing, which is when the recorded trace can be inspected by the monitor.
Hence, this monitoring approach is generally more suited for double checking the behaviour of
systems that already possess a relatively high correctness confidence.
Unlike offline monitoring, in an online monitoring setup [25, 17, 22], an executing system is
dynamically monitored for violations (or satisfactions) during the course of its execution. Online
monitors are therefore developed to execute alongside the system by verifying its execution in
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an incremental fashion [25]. This means that the monitor must be able to receive notifications
about relevant events occurring in the executing system and make a decision based on the
information it has collected so far.
As online monitors are developed to verify currently executing systems, they are also capable
of making early detections. Achieving early detections is crucial when monitoring for security
and critical properties, which may require immediate system reparation when violated. For
instance, monitoring for the correct operation of safety critical systems such as a power plant
controller would require prompt detections followed by immediate reparation, since late reaction
to errors might lead to serious consequences.
Early detections are thus, often, exploited by runtime adaptation tools [6, 7] to administer
adaptation actions with the aim of mitigating the damage incurred by the system as a result
of a property violation. The primary disadvantage of online monitoring is that it imposes an
inevitable runtime overhead on the system given that additional monitoring code is added to the
system. Since runtime overheads are an undesirable side effect, a substantial effort is generally
devoted to create efficient monitors [5, 9, 28] that minimise this overhead.
2.2 Varying definitions of Online Monitoring
In the current literature we often encounter different definitions for online monitoring, which
often encapsulate the type of instrumentation protocol employed for observing the monitored
system. In this paper, we follow the definitions for asynchronous monitoring given in [14, 27, 13,
5, 2]. These definitions state that although the synthesised monitors still execute alongside the
system, they are however loosely-coupled with the system to the extent that they barely have
any control over the monitored system and may suffer from late detections. In fact whenever a
specified event is performed by the system, an event notification is asynchronously forwarded to
the monitor without suspending any part of the system. The monitor is then able to verify the
received event notifications at its own pace, and independently from the system. It is important
to note that, unlike offline monitors, asynchronous monitors execute alongside the system and
analyse the system’s trace of events in an incremental fashion, whereas offline monitors verify
properties over a pre-recorded trace. Due to this lack of synchrony and control, asynchronous
monitors impose considerably lower overheads compared to other approaches as shown in [5].
However, most of the time an asynchronous monitor is unable to detect violations immediately
and carry out effective mitigation actions [6, 7]. Hence, we regard instrumentation protocols
as being ideal for achieving asynchronous monitoring if they enable the monitor to observe the
system without requiring (parts of) it to wait until the necessary monitoring logic ends executing.
Conversely, instrumentation techniques applied for achieving synchronous monitoring should
permit the monitor to employ some synchronisation mechanism, which delays system execution
until the necessary monitoring code executes. However, synchronous instrumentation protocols
usually vary in two aspects, namely, in the level of coupling between the monitor and the sys-
tem, and in the level of control that the monitor has over the system. For instance, synchronous
online monitoring is sometimes presented as being very tightly coupled [18, 17, 4] to the sys-
tem and as having a very high level of control over the system, to the extent that it causes all
system components to block even when only a single component generates a monitorable event.
Given that this extreme synchronous instrumentation technique uses a large amount of synchro-
nisation, it generally imposes substantial amounts of overheads and is thus more appealing for
inherently synchronous systems [17, 4] such as circuits and embedded systems. Other research
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Figure 1: The Online monitoring Spectrum.
work was conducted to reduce monitoring overheads by implementing a less stringent definition
of synchronous online monitoring. Definitions along the lines of those in [5, 11, 24, 23, 12] allow
the monitors to only block the concurrent component that generates the specified event, without
influencing the execution of the other components; other definitions, such as those in [14, 5],
invoke synchronisation at specific points to allow the lagging monitor to keep up with the sys-
tem. In the definitions given in [27, 5], synchronisation is employed only as a way to ensure the
timely detection of security-critical properties, ie., in cases where late detections are infeasible.
3 A Spectrum of Online Monitoring Instrumentation approaches
Based on the range of definitions surveyed in Section 2, we devise a spectrum of online monitoring
approaches, which we explain in the setting of component-based systems, whereby components
represent concurrent entities (eg., node, thread, actor, etc.) that can be in either of two states,
namely blocked or running. As depicted in Figure 1, this spectrum ranges from a tightly coupled
completely-synchronous (CS) monitoring instrumentation approach on the one end, to a loosely-
coupled completely-asynchronous (CA) monitoring approach on the other end.
The spectrum also presents the currently known online monitoring approaches that lie in be-
tween these two extremes; such approaches includes: Synchronous Monitoring with Synchronous
Instrumentation (SMSI), Asynchronous Monitoring with Checkpoints (AMC) and Asynchronous
Monitoring with Synchronous Detections (AMSD). These intermediate approaches provide a
trade-off between the level of coupling and control that the monitor has upon the system. It
is generally assumed that monitoring approaches that are closer to the synchronous end of the
spectrum tend to posses a higher level of control over the system, which comes at the expense
of higher overheads. Conversely, approaches that are closer to the opposite end are generally
assumed to be more efficient, yet lack a high degree of control over the monitored system. This
assumption was investigated and confirmed in [5, 29], after conducting a series of empirical
experiments using various levels of synchronisations in the employed monitoring mechanisms.
In the following subsections, we explain each monitoring instrumentation technique defined
within our spectrum wrt. an example property that assumes a simple transaction system that
must satisfy the following invariant:
“A user cannot make a transaction before a login.”
This property is thus violated whenever a component generates a transaction event trans before
executing a login event.
3.1 Completely-synchronous Monitoring (CS)
As depicted in Figure 1, Completely-synchronous Monitoring [18, 17, 4] refers to the synchronous
extreme of the spectrum. As shown in Figure 2 below, this implies that the system and the
monitors are so tightly coupled together to the extent that whenever an event occurs in one
component of the system, such as C1, the entire system execution is interrupted (as shown
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by (1)). The system components remain blocked until the necessary monitoring checks are
performed, in which case the monitor unblocks the components (as shown by (2)).
Figure 2: Completely-synchronous Monitoring (CS)
As depicted by (3) and (4), completely-synchronous monitoring allows for our property to be
immediately detected since all the system’s components (including the offending component C2)
are blocked at the time when the violation is detected. Since CS monitoring provides timely
detections, it can therefore be used to effectively mitigate incorrect behaviour. This instru-
mentation approach is, however, highly intrusive as it introduces an unnecessarily high level of
synchronisation that might lead to an infeasible performance degradation on the monitored sys-
tem. Completely-synchronous monitoring is generally applied to traditional monolithic systems
and also to small synchronous systems [17, 4] such as embedded systems and circuits.
3.2 Synchronous Monitoring with Synchronous Instrumentation (SMSI)
Synchronous Monitoring with Synchronous Instrumentation [24, 23, 12, 11, 5] is a monitoring
approach that is close to a completely-synchronous approach, yet is less intrusive. In fact as
shown in Figure 3 below, this approach assumes that whenever a single component of the mon-
itored system, such as C1, executes a specified event, then only the execution of this component
is interrupted (as shown by (1)). This component remains blocked until monitoring completes,
in which case the component is reset to a running state (as shown by (2)).
Figure 3: Synchronous Monitoring with Synchronous Instrumentation (SMSI)
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As illustrated by (3) and (4), a violation is only detected for component C2 since this executes
a trans event without a preceding login event — once again this violation is detected in a timely
fashion since C2 was blocked by the monitor upon generating the offending event. C1, however,
was allowed to proceed with its execution given that it executed a correct event sequence, ie., a
login followed by a trans event.
Synchronous instrumentation monitoring hence reduces the level of overall synchronisation
by relinquishing control over the other components, thereby allowing them to keep executing
whenever a certain component generates an event. However, this monitoring technique still
possesses a relatively high level of control over the system, as it still needs to synchronously
inspect each and every event, even though it only interrupts the component, that generated the
event, until monitoring completes.
3.3 Asynchronous Monitoring with Checkpoints (AMC)
This approach [14, 18] allows for an asynchronous decoupling between the system (or parts of
it) and monitor executions, while also providing the user with the ability to specify checkpoints
where the decoupled system and monitor executions should synchronise. We conjecture that, for
component-based systems, checkpoints may also be associated with specific system components.
For instance, as shown by (1) and (2) in Figure 4, a specifier may use a checkpoint to specify
that certain system components, such as C1 and C2, should temporarily block their execution
and synchronise with the monitor. Such synchronisation can be done during periods in which
the system is not required to be responsive, and therefore permits waiting for the monitor to
catch up with the system execution.
Figure 4: Asynchronous Monitoring with Checkpoints (AMC)
As shown by (3), once the monitor synchronises with the system, it unblocks component
C1 and allows its execution to proceed, since it executes a trans action after a login. The
monitor, however, flags a violation for C2 and opts not to unblock the assigned checkpoint
thereby allowing the violation to be timely detected. An appealing feature of this monitoring
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approach is that it enables the user to manually determine the level of synchrony and control
that the monitor can possess over the system. The user may also use this mechanism to specify
that the system should stop and wait for the monitor’s analysis to complete when certain safety-
critical events occur during execution [14]. This ensures that safety-critical violations are timely
detected, thus permitting the monitor to effectively react to the violation and possibly invoke
mitigating actions. To further reduce the level of monitor intrusion, the user may specify that
the system should keep on executing whenever it generates non-safety critical events.
3.4 Asynchronous Monitoring with Synchronous Detection (AMSD)
Asynchronous Monitoring with synchronous detection [5, 27] is yet another monitoring ap-
proach that lies close to completely-asynchronous monitoring in our spectrum. As completely-
asynchronous monitors sacrifice timely detections for efficiency, this intermediate approach at-
tempts to introduce synchronous (timely) detections into asynchronous monitoring. The system
may therefore send event notifications without blocking in the same way as in completely-
asynchronous monitoring. The system is, however, required to synchronously monitor for critical
events that may directly lead to a property violation. This approach uses minimal synchroni-
sation to ensure synchronous (timely) detections, since synchronisation is employed only for
system events that might directly contribute to a violation.
Figure 5: Asynchronous Monitoring with Synchronous Detection (AMSD)
As our property is only violated whenever a transaction event (trans) is observed without a
preceding login event, to detect violations of our property in a timely fashion, it suffices that
the monitor synchronises only with a system component whenever the component performs a
transaction event. As shown by (1) in Figure 5, only component C2 is blocked, because it
produced a transaction event that may lead to a property violation. By contrast C1 kept on
executing since the login event it produced does not directly lead to a detection. In (2) we see
that the monitor managed to detect that C2 violated our property, as it did not execute a login
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action prior to performing the transaction. The detection was thus achieved in a timely manner
since C2 was not allowed (in (1)) to execute any further after committing the transaction event
that led to the violation. Furthermore in (2) one can notice that C1 blocked waiting for the
monitor’s verdict as a result of producing a transaction event, in which case the monitor detects
that C1 had already performed a login event meaning that it did not violate our property. Hence
in (3) the monitor allows C1 to proceed.
3.5 Completely-asynchronous Monitoring (CA)
Finally, in Completely-asynchronous Monitoring [2, 21, 5, 13] the monitors are designed to be as
loosely coupled as possible from the system they are monitoring. In fact completely-asynchronous
monitors are designed to listen for system events and handle them in the background without
interfering in any way with the system execution. Hence, as shown in Figure 6, in completely-
asynchronous monitoring, the system is allowed to proceed immediately after placing an event
notification (eg., C1 login) in the monitor’s buffer. The monitor can then independently read
the event notifications from its buffer and carry out the necessary checks at its own pace.
Figure 6: Completely-asynchronous Monitoring (CA)
Although this approach imposes minimal intrusion in the monitored system, it suffers from
late detection. This is shown in Figure 6, since the violation performed by component C2 was
detected after it managed to produce a subsequent login event. This makes it highly unlikely for
an asynchronous monitor to be able to effectively mitigate the detected misbehaviour. As offline
monitoring [18, 27] is inherently asynchronous, it is sometimes classified as being an asynchronous
monitoring approach. However, we conjecture that offline monitoring generally requires pre-
recorded (generally complete) traces, while CA monitoring can incrementally analyse partial
traces that can be extended as the system proceeds with its execution.
4 Current Tool Implementations
Several runtime monitoring tools have been developed, some of which implement more than
one monitoring approach. In this section we review a sample of these tools and classify them
according to our spectrum. In order to denote the wide variety of the tools available in the
current literature, the reviewed tools were selected based on: the monitoring instrumentation
approaches that they implement, the technologies and architectures that they target, and the
design paradigms employed to implement the monitor.
We start our review by illustrating a comparison of the monitoring approaches that are
implemented by the reviewed runtime monitoring tools in Table 1. Following this we provide a
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detailed discussion about the monitoring approaches employed by each of these tools.
Online Offline
Tool CS SMSI AMC AMSD CA
DecentMon
Lola
JEagle
DB/Temporal-Rover
Java-MOP
Larva toolkit
detectEr toolkit
Exago
Table 1: A Comparison of monitoring approaches implemented in Runtime Monitoring tools.
DecentMon DecentMon [4] is a decentralized runtime monitoring tool developed in OCaml,
which allows users to specify properties for synchronous distributed systems by using standard
LTL syntax. This relieves the LTL specifications from having to include implementation details
denoting specific components where the required events should occur.
This tool achieves a completely-synchronous monitoring (CS) approach by initially converting
a given formula into n small monitors, ie, one monitor for each component in the distributed
system. Each of these monitors is attached to a single component and utilizes progression
(formula rewriting) to update its current version of the LTL formula according to the events
occurring in the local trace of the component it is attached to. Whenever the monitors require
information about events occurring in other components, they migrate by sending their current
LTL formula to the monitor which is attached to the component that can generate the required
event. Furthermore, since synchronous distributed systems are governed and synchronised using
a global clock, the necessary monitoring is theoretically carried out in between each clock cycle.
In practice the entire distributed system must block until the distributed monitors are done
migrating and performing checks. This approach also guarantees that violations are detected
within a maximum bounded delay that is proportional to the number of components in the
synchronous distributed system.
This tool is more suited for monitoring circuits and embedded systems, eg., in automobiles,
which are usually developed using multiple parallel components that work in synchrony with
each other by using a global clock.
Lola Lola [17] is another runtime monitoring tool which offers both offline and completely-
synchronous (CS) online monitoring approaches that provide bounded resources guarantees.
This tool allows a user to specify the necessary correctness properties using a mixture of past-time
LTL and future-time LTL. When opting for offline monitoring the tool inspects the operations
occurring in an execution of the system and dumps the collected trace to a storage device once
the system runs to completion. The offline monitor is then able to randomly access different
parts of the collected trace, which allows it to carry out analysis algorithms, such as Backward
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Tracing, which cannot be applied in an online monitoring approach. This helps in order to make
more accurate detections.
Lola efficiently implements a completely-synchronous online monitoring approach for which
the space requirement is independent of the size of the execution trace, and is linear in the size
of the LTL specification. The synthesised monitor is designed to work entirely in synchrony with
the system. In fact, whenever the monitor is required to perform certain runtime checks, the
entire system must block waiting for the monitor to finish. Similar to DecentMon, Lola is
more intended to be used for monitoring of synchronous systems including circuits and embedded
systems.
Eagle and JEagle Eagle [3] is a language-independent, rule-based, runtime verification tool
which extends µ-calculus with data parametrization and was specifically designed to support
future and past-time logics, interval logics, extended regular expressions, state machines and
real-time and data constraints. In order to support these different logics and constraints, Eagle
implements the basic logical operators and the next and previous temporal logic operators. By
implementing these primitive logical operators, the remaining operators become a matter of
syntactic sugar; in fact, Eagle encodes more complex operators in terms of these primitive
operators. Although Eagle was implemented as a Java library, it does not support automatic
code instrumentation for the collection of events, and in fact requires the user to manually create
a projection of the actual program state. The user-defined properties are then evaluated with
respect to this projected program state.
JEagle [16] is an extended version of Eagle which supports automated instrumentation
and object reasoning at the expense of making the tool language specific, meaning that it can
only be applied to programs written in Java. This tool implements synchronous monitoring
with synchronous instrumentation (SMSI) through code inlining. In fact, JEagle converts the
specified properties into Java code and uses aspect-oriented programming to automatically inline
the necessary monitoring code in a given system. In the case of multithreaded Java programs,
whenever a specified event occurs in a system thread, this code inlining mechanism would cause
the Java thread which generated event, to pause its normal execution and start executing the
monitor’s code. The thread continues executing the system’s code once the monitoring code
completes.
DB-Rover and Temporal-Rover The DB-Rover [19, 18] allows a user to specify temporal
rules using either Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), or an extended version of LTL called Metric
Temporal Logic (MTL) which permits the specification of lower bounds, upper bounds, and
ranges for discrete-time and real-time properties. These properties are then automatically con-
verted into monitoring code using the Temporal-Rover compiler.
Temporal-Rover does not embed the monitoring code into the system, but it adds code
which connects to a standalone DB-Rover remote server that carries out the necessary valida-
tion checks. Whenever a specified system event occurs at runtime, the inserted code sends a
monitoring request containing the necessary information to the remote DB-Rover server, which
checks the received information against the specified temporal rules. This server supports on-
line monitoring using both (i) a synchronous instrumentation (SMSI) approach and also (ii) a
completely-asynchronous (CA) approach.
Temporal-Rover implements (i) by adding synchronous TCP sends and receives into the
monitored system to allow it to communicate the necessary event information to the remote
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server. Whenever a system thread encounters a specified event, it invokes a synchronous TCP-
send operation to supply the necessary event information to the server, which causes the system
thread to wait until the monitoring server issues a synchronous receive.
Conversely, Temporal-Rover provides (ii) by adding asynchronous TCP sends and receives
instead. In this way whenever a system thread encounters a specified event, it immediately
sends the required information to the server and keeps on executing. Furthermore, Temporal-
Rover also provides offline monitoring by capturing the information in a database and then
using DB-Rover to analyse the collected trace information once the system stops. DB-Rover
and Temporal-Rover aim to be utilized for business and security applications.
Java-MOP Java-MOP [10] is a Java-based tool which implements the monitoring-oriented
programming (MOP) paradigm [11]. This programming paradigm aims to combine the specifi-
cation of a system together with its implementation. Although MOP employs the same concept
of runtime verification, monitoring in MOP is not used for double checking a system but is
instead an integral part of the system’s design. MOP therefore aims to separate development
concerns, by allowing a system to be first developed without any sort of verification checks, and
then be augmented with the necessary monitoring checks that are automatically synthesised
from a given set of formally defined correctness properties.
The Java-MOP tool provides support for numerous specification languages including past-
time and future-time LTL, extended regular expressions and others. Similar to Temporal-
Rover, Java-MOP uses a client-server approach and supports offline monitoring, completely-
asynchronous monitoring (CA) as well as synchronous instrumentation monitoring (SMSI)
achieved through inlining of verification checks.
The Larva toolkit Larva [15] is yet another Java-based runtime verification tool for object-
oriented systems, which provides an automata-based specification language called Dynamic Au-
tomata with Timers and Events (DATE). This specification language allows a user to specify
both real-time and discrete-time properties in terms of automata. This tool is capable of con-
verting the same DATE specification into either an offline monitor or into an online monitor,
where the latter utilizes a synchronous-instrumentation (SMSI) approach.
The tool achieves offline monitoring by converting the specification into aspect code which
extracts and logs the specified system events into a database whenever they occur while the
system executes. The Larva compiler also generates an offline-monitor and a replayer program,
where the latter is used to extract the collected events from the database and replay them such
that the offline monitor is able to analyse the recoded trace and detect any violations.
Larva also creates online monitors by using aspect-oriented programming instrumentation
to automatically insert the necessary verification checks inside the system components (objects)
that generate the specified events. By using code-inlining this tool achieves online monitor-
ing through a synchronous-instrumentation approach. In the case of multi-threaded systems,
whenever an object component generates an event on one particular thread, only the thread in
question is required to temporarily halt its normal operations and start executing the monitor-
ing code. When the thread finishes executing the checks, it continues with the normal system
execution from the point at which it was previously interrupted. Therefore, the other threads
are not affected in any way while the injected monitoring code checks the generated event.
eLarva [13] is an Erlang-based re-implementation of Larva for actor-oriented systems. Due
to the asynchronous nature of the actor-oriented paradigm offered by Erlang, this tool explores
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the opposite end of the online monitoring spectrum. In fact eLarva converts DATE specifica-
tions into a completely-asynchronous monitor (CA) without adding any form of instrumentation
code inside the monitored system. Instead, it uses the tracing mechanism [1] provided by the
Erlang Virtual Machine to capture instances when a system actor sends or receives a specified
Erlang message. Whenever a specified event occurs in an actor, the tracing mechanism sends a
message to the asynchronous monitor synthesised by eLarva. The synthesised asynchronous-
monitor consists in a set of monitoring actors which block waiting to receive trace messages
denoting relevant events occurring on the monitored system. Whenever the monitoring actors
receive a relevant event, they unblock and carry out the necessary checks independently from
the monitored system.
The detectEr toolkit detectEr [2, 21] is a runtime monitoring framework that converts prop-
erties, expressed using Hennessey Milner Logic with recursion, into monitors for Erlang systems.
Originally, detectEr was developed to synthesise completely-asynchronous monitors that were ca-
pable of observing Erlang systems by using the asynchronous tracing mechanism [1] provided
by the Erlang Virtual Machine.
Subsequent work on the tool saw the inclusion of several optimisation techniques [9] along
with an extension that allows the specifier to select between completely-asynchronous moni-
toring (CA), synchronous instrumentation monitoring (SMSI), asynchronous monitoring with
checkpoints (AMC) and synchronous detection monitoring (AMSD) − this extended version is
known as detectEr 2.0 [5]. To implement this variety of monitoring approaches, the tracing
mechanism had to be replaced by code instrumentation that was achieved through an aspect-
oriented programming framework for Erlang called eAOP [8]. eAOP allowed for instrumenting
the system with a custom tracing protocol that, apart from reporting events to the monitor as
asynchronous messages, is also able to force certain system components to block waiting for the
monitor’s feedback, thereby achieving synchrony.
CA in detectEr 2.0 is implemented by completely omitting the requirement for concurrent
system components to wait for the monitor’s feedback. By contrast, SMSI is achieved by forcing
each system component to block for every reported event. AMC and AMSD (referred to as hybrid
in detectEr 2.0) are achieved through an extension to the specification language that saw the
inclusion of synchronous necessities and synchronous verdicts. Synchronous necessities are used
to force the instrumented component to wait for feedback whenever the event described in the
necessity is reported to the monitor. Hence, AMC is achieved since synchronous necessities serve
as checkpoints that allow the lagging monitor to catch up and synchronise with the system. On
the other hand, synchronous verdicts allows for achieving AMSD, since they only force system
components to synchronously report events that may lead to a violation.
The synchronisation protocol introduced in detectEr 2.0 was also used to allow for adaptation
actions to be effectively applied to specific Erlang components, in a timely manner. Adaptation
actions allowed the monitor to apply rectifying actions (eg., restarting or terminating misbe-
having components) in order to mitigate the effects incurred by the detected violation. This
extension led to the creation of a Runtime Adaptation tool called adaptEr [6, 7].
Exago Exago [20] is an Erlang-based runtime monitoring tool which implements an offline
monitoring approach, to perform data mining on event logs. CaExago is capable of gathering
the necessary log files, using abstraction and validation functions to create abstract represen-
tations of the events that occurred in the monitored system, and evaluating complete traces of
these event representations, against a monitoring state machine that verifies whether the logged
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events denote a valid behaviour or an invalid one. Being an offline monitoring tool, Exago
imposes low runtime overheads since at runtime it only logs events, which are then verified once
the entire event trace is collected.
In order to further simplify the process of manually specifying a state machine model, Exago
was also extended with the ability of analysing the collected logs and generating a state machine
representation which models the analysed behaviour.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a spectrum of online monitoring approaches, and explained each approach
in the setting of component based systems. The spectrum consists in completely-synchronous
monitoring on one end, which achieves an extremely high level of control over the system that
could potentially jeopardise monitoring efficiency, and completely-asynchronous monitoring on
the opposite end, which provides efficient monitors with very low intrusion over the monitored
system, by sacrificing the level of control over the monitored system, including timely detections.
We have also identified a number of intermediate approaches that lie in between these two online
monitoring extremes in our spectrum. We also conjecture that there may be other intermediate
approaches apart from the ones that we identified which still need to be explored.
The terminology established in the identified spectrum advocate for a better understanding
of the design space that one needs to explore when developing a software monitoring or a
runtime verification tool. Hence, our spectrum also provides guidance for future development
of monitoring tools. Finally, our spectrum also helps to facilitate the comparison between
monitoring instrumentation approaches. In fact, this also enabled us to analyse the monitoring
instrumentation approaches, which have been implemented by a number of runtime monitoring
tools, wrt. our classification.
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